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Abstract Decision-making barriers challenge port administrators to adapt and build
resilience to natural hazards. Heavy rains, storms, sea level rise (SLR), and extreme heat
can damage the critical coastal infrastructure upon which coastal communities depend.
There is limited understanding of what impedes port decision makers from investing
resources in climate and extreme weather adaptations. Through semi-structured interviews
of 30 port directors/managers, environmental specialists, and safety planners at 15 mediumand high-use ports of the U.S. North Atlantic, this paper contributes a typology of seven
key adaptation barriers. We measured shared knowledge of the identified barriers using a
cultural consensus model (CCM). Knowledge of the barriers that prevent or delay resilience
investments can help the decision makers direct their resources to help reduce coastal
vulnerability and support safe and sustainable operations of U.S. ports. Such actions also
serve to help prepare the marine transportation system for future climate and extreme
weather events.
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Introduction
Port decision makers need to plan for adaptation to storms and extreme weather events to
reduce risks of disaster and increase the ports’ resilience (NRC 2009, Biesbroek et al.
2011). Active planning, as opposed to reactive planning (Kretsch, 2016), can help ports
ensure long-term sustainability. Coastal infrastructures are adapted to climate change by
protecting their coastlines, elevating their piers, designing for submersion or abandoning
when the cost of adaptation is not worth the investment (Becker et al. 2018). In 2012, the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) described how adaptations require
“adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli
or their effects, which moderates harm or exploit beneficial opportunities” (2012, p. 5,
Taylor 2019). Furthermore, the IPCC warned that researchers would face challenges in
understanding the processes by which adaptation is occurring and will occur in the future
(Adger et al. 2007, IPCC 2007). They highlighted that the first step in addressing climate
change adaptation is to understand the barriers that exist and their context in order to plan
strategies to overcome them. In response to these concerns, social-scientists started
studying barriers to climate change (Moser and Ekstrom 2010).
Some progress is being made: in the U.S., projects regulated by the Army Corp of
Engineers (USACE) are incorporating sea level rise (SLR) into their design specifications
(USACE 2014). Recent studies suggest that some ports are addressing climate change risks
(Scott et al. 2013, Ng et al. 2018, McEvoy and Mullett 2013, Mullett et al. 2013, Diego
2018, Stenek et al. 2011, Zeppie) or responding to Hurricane impacts (Becker 2016b). But,
coastal communities have experienced and continue to experience worsening impacts from
climate change-related natural hazards (Melillo, Richmond, and Yohe 2014). Although
these changes are inevitable (IPCC 2012, Melillo, Richmond, and Yohe 2014) damages to
critical infrastructure can be reduced through the implementation of adaptations that build
natural hazard resilience (Füssel 2007).
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The purpose of this study is to understand barriers to climate and extreme weather
adaptation for one critical sector of coastal infrastructure: seaports. Using empirical data
collected from port administrators, we explore how seaport decision makers perceived
barriers, and whether there was a shared agreement in the identified types of barriers that
port directors/managers, environmental specialists and safety planners face. Interviewees
answered questions about the barriers to climate and extreme weather adaptation (e.g.,
‘What are some of the challenges to implementing extreme weather adaptation actions at
your port?’) and their perceptions of the port’s vulnerability. Through analysis of the
interviews and a literature review on barriers to climate and extreme weather adaptation,
researchers developed a port-specific typology of barriers to climate and extreme weather
adaptation.
Barriers are defined as “… obstacles that can be overcome with concerted effort, creative
management, change of thinking, and the related shift in resources, land uses, institutions,
etc.” (Moser and Ekstrom 2010, p. 22027). Building natural hazard resilience depends on
decision makers overcoming these barriers, so that systems can bounce back quickly
following a storm event. Several studies identify barriers or propose frameworks to identify
and analyze them (Moser and Ekstrom 2010, Biesbroek et al. 2013). Fewer studies present
guidance for interventions (Moser and Ekstrom 2010), or their context (Biesbroek et al.
2013), or how to build the adaptive capacity necessary to overcome such barriers (Siders,
2019). In 2010, Moser and Ekstrom addressed these limitations in a comprehensive policy
framework for identifying and analyzing barriers that also provided guidance for capacitybuilding interventions (Moser and Ekstrom 2010).
Barriers to adaptation can be institutional (Adger et al. 2007, Barnett et al. 2013), or
socio-cultural (Burch 2010); these can also be informational, financial, and cognitive
(Adger et al. 2007). Differences and subjectivity arise when trying to categorizing barriers
(Jones and Boyd 2011), but typologies such as the one proposed here increase our general
understanding of where opportunities lie for overcoming such challenges. Barriers to
adaptation in the spheres of governance can be explained (Adger and Barnett 2009, Adger,
Lorenzoni, and O'Brien 2009, Moser and Ekstrom 2010, Barnett et al. 2013) as challenges
in leadership, caused by uncertainty in the roles and responsibilities across different levels

3

of governance (Moser and Ekstrom 2010, Barnett et al. 2013). These challenges are also
reflected in barriers reported in policy initiatives (Tompkins et al. 2010), many of which are
intensified by the uncertainty in climate change projections (Barnett et al. 2013). In a study
on barriers conducted in Australia, Barnett et al. described five main barriers to adaptation
for coastal communities, these are: governance, policy, uncertainty, resources, and
psychosocial factors. The study also recognized the shared responsibility of key actors in
adapting to sea level rise, and the role played by different levels of governance (Barnett et
al. 2013).
Biesbroek et al.’s studies highlight that while some barriers to climate and extreme
weather adaptation are not necessarily climate change specific (2013), others stem from the
“long term impacts of climate change versus the short term dynamics of politics and
decision-making; the reliance on scientific models to identify, understand and communicate
problem and propose solutions, and the inherent uncertainty and ambiguities of climate
change” (Biesbroek et al. 2013, P. 1124).
Similar to general barriers to adaptation mentioned earlier, ports are also challenged by
the complexity of their governance and leadership (Becker and Caldwell 2015), as well as
by a lack of communication between key stakeholders (Ng et al. 2018). As the National
Research Council (NRC) notes, effective climate adaptation will require all types of
decision makers and stakeholders to participate (NRC 2010). Others emphasize on the
importance of adopting an ‘adaptation pathways’, a process for planning that enables
decision makers to assess climate changes within broader context that address societal
transitions and transformations (Wise et al. 2014).
In the following sections, we present the methods of our study, the study sites, and
analysis, followed by the results on decision makers’ perceptions of barriers to climate and
extreme weather adaptation in 15 ports of the North Atlantic. Port directors, environmental
specialists and safety officers’ perceptions on the barriers to climate and extreme weather
adaptation are presented, along with the context in which they were discussed during the
interviews. In the discussion, we expand on the implications of these findings. Improving
decision-making to adapt ports to climate and extreme weather events can only decrease
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future risks and increase a seaports resilience to these impacts. In the long term, coastal
cities face dramatic changes from sea level rise and eventually many ports may no longer
be viable due to inundation. However, assessing where federal resources should be
directed, and where future key investments can be made sustain operations of major ports is
an essential step towards increasing resilience of the maritime transportation system (Hsieh
2014, Becker et al. 2014, Chhetri et al. 2014).
Methods
This study investigates seaport-specific barriers to climate and extreme weather adaptation
for 15 Medium and High-use ports in the North Atlantic. Between November 2017 and
February 2018, our research team interviewed 30 decision makers in order to develop a
framework for perceptions of the barriers 1 to climate and extreme weather adaptation. The
data were also used to develop a cultural consensus model to measure the decision makers’
consensus on the barriers. Port decision makers in this study are defined as port
directors/managers, environmental specialists and safety planners who have responsibility
for decision making related to climate and extreme weather resilience. Not all ports have
representatives for these positions. For some ports, aspects of these roles are outsourced to
private consultants. In most areas, harbor masters and the U.S. Coast Guard have additional
responsibility for the safety planning of coastal infrastructure in a region. However, this
study was limited to employees of the ports who are charged with leadership and decision
making within the studied ports. The responsibilities of each group are described in Table
1.
Table 1 Description of responsibilities of port decision maker positions.

Position

1

Number
interviewed

Responsibilities

Interview protocol and procedures were approved by the Institute of Review Board at the University of Rhode Island
(IRB Approved 894694-8). Interviewees were informed of the purpose of the study and that they give a written or oral
consent to being interviewed and being recorded (for transcription purposes only). The majority of interviews (73%,
22/30) were conducted in person, 27% were conducted over the phone, 10 of the ports were visited.

5

Directors or managers

17

Common titles:
- executive director
- director of operations
- project manager

Environmental specialists

8

Common titles:
- marine environment
& civil engineering consultant
- manager of strategic planning
- harbor master
- environmental manager
- project manager
- climate mitigation and
. resilience manager
Safety planners

5

Common titles:
- vice president of sustainability
(consultant)
- chief harbor
safety strategist and
operations assistant

•

Run port operations and systems
(short or long term)

•

Perform maintenance of vessels
and facilities

•

Supervise employees

•

Manage specific functions of port
facilities

•

Plan efficient use of port
resources, with attention to
security, safety, and health of
personnel

•

Monitor related environmental
regulations

•

Oversee environmental
protection and
other social
responsibility functions.

•

Monitor and assess hazardous
and unsafe situations

•

Develop guidelines for personnel
safety

Management and governance structures vary across the ports. Those without a port
authority are privately owned or managed by a private entity in the name of the state (Table
2). Because the number of decision makers and their years’ experience can influence
perceptions, these data are also included in Table 2.
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Table 2 Demographics representing the study’s participating decision makers.

Number of participating ports
Ports with port authority
Number of interviews
Types of decision makers
Directors and managers
Safety planners
Environmental specialists

15/22
9/15
30
17
8
5

Years of Experience
<5
5 - 10
11 - 20
> 20
Range of experience
Gender of decision makers
Female
Male

7
7
8
8
1 - 46 (years)

8/30
22/30

Data Collection
Interviews were conducted at 15 out of 22 medium- and high-use ports of the United States
Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) North Atlantic Divisioni (CENAD) (S 1). The ports
were selected in consultation with the U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development
Center (ERDC) to represent ports with a varying degree of risk to major hurricanes.
There were two sections of the semi-structured interviews, with nine and eight questions
respectively (S 2). The first section sought to understand perceptions of barriers to climate
and extreme weather adaptation, and the second to understand perceptions of port
vulnerability. Questions were open-ended, hence, the absence of a mention of a barrier does
not mean that the port is not challenged by it, but that other challenges were more palpable
to interviewee (S 2).
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Data analysis
The analysis was divided into three steps. First, we coded responses to identify the major
barriers as perceived by respondents. Second, we ran a the cultural consensus model
(CCM) using ANTHROPAC 6.46 software (Borgatti 1996) to assess agreement between
different respondents. The CCM assumes that there is a shared cultural knowledge and
aggregates individual “culturally correct responses” to measures the level of agreement
between individuals (Weller 2007, Romney, Batchelder, and Weller 1987). A Pearson
correlation coefficient value indicates if there is an association between two variables
measures associations or agreement between the subjects. Third, we compared the
responses across the categories to identify patterns or variation in the responses across the
different decision makers groups.
After the transcription of the interviews, we coded the transcripts line-by-line using the
NVivo qualitative data analysis software package (NVivo 2014). Reviewing the transcripts,
we identified and classified the barriers, and resolved coding differences between
researchers’ assessments where necessary 2, following the process laid out by Ekstrom and
Moser (2014). The coding scheme used an iterative process based on grounded theory
(Charmaz 2006, Glaser and Strauss 2017). Statements characterized as a constraint, a
challenge, or a limitation to the adaptation process, were coded as a potential barrier. This
process allowed for views and concepts to emerge and be grouped into unique categories.
Results
The analysis of the 30 decision makers interviews from 15 ports in the North Atlantic
resulted in the identification of seven perceived barriers to climate and extreme weather
adaptation (Figure 1). Barriers include: the lack of understanding of the risks (mentioned
by 93% of responses), lack of funding (77%), perceived levels of risks do not exceed the
action threshold (70%), governance disconnect (67%), physical constraints (67%), lack of
communication amongst individuals (7%), and the problem (of adaptation) is

2

NVivo Coding comparison between coders; in the initial coding phase, yielded a 0.696 Kappa value (Values between
0.40 - 0.75 = fair to good agreement).
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overwhelming (7%). Figure 1 shows the number of respondents that mentioned at least one
barrier from each of the seven categories at least one time during the interview.
Figure 1 Seven barriers to climate and extreme weather adaptations resulted from 30 interviews in 15 North
Atlantic ports. The value above each colored pie is the percentage of respondents who mentioned that barrier
within the decision maker type (directors/managers, environmental specialists, safety planners). Blue numbers
are the total frequency of the responses. The blue-outlined pie is the overall percentage of responses for a
barrier.

The following section presents the results of the cultural consensus model (CCM) and
then explains each of the seven major categories of the identified barriers.
The cultural consensus model results
Fit to the cultural consensus model (CCM) is given by the factor ratio of 3 to 1 or greater,
that is a standard indication of clustering. We deemed eigenvalue ratio of 2.91as sufficient
evidence of conditional independence between factor 1 and 2, and evidence of shared
knowledge (Borgatti 1996). The percentages of the responses in our data show a strong
cultural pattern, meaning that respondents have a high agreement in their responses. When
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the factor ratio is smaller than 3 this indicates that respondents divide into ‘two’ or ‘more’
populations –meaning that their views are not homogeneous.
The competence score in the CCM represents a measure of respondents’ shared knowledge.
For the studied group, the average competence score is 0.598, and the values range from
0.981 (highest agreement) to 0.067 (low or absence of agreement) (Table 3). As an
example, when two respondents answered that barrier #1 and barrier #2 were the main
challenges, their competence score could be closer to ‘1’, or 0.981. But when a third
respondent who mentioned barrier #3 to be most important, its competence score could be
closer to 0.598. The closer their competence score is closer to ‘1’, the higher is their
agreement with the mean, and the closer the competence score is to ‘0’, the lesser is their
agreement.
Table 3 Cultural consensus model analysis: consensus for 30 port decision makers on the perceived barriers
to climate and extreme weather adaptation. The factor loading is measure of the variance of the observed
variables a factor explains more variance than a single observed variable.

Sample (n = 30)

First

2nd

1st to 2nd

Average

Factor

Factor

factor ratio

"competency"

14.282

4.905

2.912

0.598
(St. Dev. 0.25)

Typology of seven key barriers to climate and extreme weather adaptation for
seaports
This section describes the seven categories of barriers, and how decision makers in
different categories perceived them. Each barrier is explained within the context in which it
was mentioned by the respondent, and some examples are provided. For example, the
barrier lack of understanding of risks was mentioned in the context of confusion over the
level of risk and the difficulty of predicting where (or if) impacts will be (For further details
on the context in which each barrier is mentioned see S 3). Distinct responses and
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differences in viewpoints of given groups were also highlighted. In parenthesis, the
respondent category is noted, as follows: DIR = Port Director, ES = Environmental
Specialist, SP = Safety Planner.
The respondents not only mentioned one barrier to adaptation, but multiple ones when
being interviewed, we illustrate this complexity in Figure 2. For example, seven
directors/managers are represented in A. One director could have mentioned up to five of
the seven adaptation barriers during the interview. Similarly, in part B all the safety officers
that participated mentioned from two to five barriers (Figure 2).
Figure 2 The complexity of the responses: one respondent can mention one to five different barriers. (A)
Ports at which directors mentioned up to five of the identified adaptation barriers. (B) The five interviewed
safety officers also mentioned the same five barriers.

The distribution of responses across all decision makers categories illustrates how
barriers are perceived by type of decision maker, with further context provided (Figure 3
and S 3). To illustrate these differences, the 15 ports (labeled ports A - N) are organized
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Figure 3 Barriers and the responses by ports and the participating decision makers. The colors in each box
denote when respondents in each decision maker group that mentioned the barrier at least one time. The color
denotes agreement (green), or absence of agreement (grey).
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by the number of decision maker categories who participated. First, the ports where only
directors/managers participated are presented, then ports where port directors/managers and
either environmental specialist or safety officers participated are presented, and lastly, ports
where all of them participated. Agreement on a barrier category is coded in green, and
absence of agreement, in grey. The columns represent the decision makers categories for
the 15 different ports, and the rows indicate whether or not they mentioned a given barrier
to adaptation. In descending order of frequency (1 > 7), the barriers mentioned most
frequently also present highest agreement level for the decision makers categories.
Secondly, in ports where all decision makers participated (Ports D, H & L), almost all of
the respondents agreed that lack of understanding of risks was a barrier, but one
environmental specialist—out of a team of two—mentioned lack of funding, and perceived
risks do not meet action threshold.
Barrier 1 Lack of understanding of risks
The lack of understanding of risks was mentioned by 28 of 30 respondents (Figure 3),
representing 13 of 15 ports. Many of the decision makers mentioned lack of understanding
of risks as it related to the difficulty in predicting impacts or if the hazard will occur, like
where at their port the flooding might occur (S 3). Many felt that severe weather events in
the past (if there were any) did not serve as predictions for the future. As an example, one
respondent said “. . . The storm was over 50miles/hours gusts, but we typically don't see a
whole lot of these [level of the storm]” (DIR). Sometimes, expected damages do not occur
or require an unanticipated response. In another example, one decision maker said: “. . . the
flooding was coming from the other way . . . from a direction people were not expecting it .
. .” (ES)
Respondents described resilience planning as often being reactionary and myopic, with
ports engaging in mitigation planning only after a natural hazard and then preparing to
respond to similar hazards in the future based on the latest experience, rather than for the
full range of plausible events. As one decision maker said, “I think that we have done
enough . . . measure[ing] ourselves up against the next Hurricane Sandy . . . But
unfortunately, the reality is Sandy was not nearly as bad as it could have been.” (DIR).
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Another explained , “. . . because we got hit with flooding and surge, we . . . react [only] to
flooding and surge . . . there is not really a focus on the other hazards we are facing.” (SP).
Others emphasized the need to understand the full suite of risk, not just the risk at the
terminal itself, stating, “Even if our terminals are resilient, getting goods and services off
the terminal and over the transportation network might pose challenges if . . . networks are
not adequately resilient.” (ES). Environmental specialists emphasized the need to conduct
regular risks assessments to help overcome this barrier.
Barrier 2 Lack of funding
Twenty-three of 30 respondents mentioned lack of funding (Figure 1), defined here as the
absence of financial resources or the absence of trained human resources to implement the
needed adaptations (Figure 3 and S 3). In Figure 3, the levels of agreement are represented
by their percentages, along with the number of mentions per decision maker category. Lack
of funding referred to both capital costs and maintenance costs, as well as costs related to
planning and assessment. Maintenance, for example, provides an opportunity to make
improvements that integrate resilience to climate and extreme weather considerations.
However, planning for smarter, longer-term resilience also adds cost. One director
explained, “We inherited some old facilities at the port and are . . . rehabilitating our main
pier . . . built in 1956. . .” But, as the words of another director at the port made clear,
building in resilience measures on these projects “. . . comes down to money.” (DIR)
Decision makers explained how funding for resilience was in competition with other
pressing needs. As ships get larger, waterways become too narrow or shallow to
accommodate them. This issue often trumps resilience challenges, as ports must keep pace
and spend capital on dredging channels or purchasing larger cranes. Compliance with
environmental regulations was also perceived as diverting monies away from resilience.
As respondent stated, “. . . the commercial fishing industry, with all the regulatory
problems that they have, can't bear the financial burden [of resilience investment].” (DIR)
Compliance other regulations, such as the American Disabilities Act (ADA), can increase
the costs of adaptation, especially when space is limited. An environmental specialist
mentioned the port’s electrical components’ exposure to climate and extreme weather
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events, noting that newer technology does not always perform under extreme weather
conditions. Another noted that “electrical substations are very low and not elevated
sufficiently . . . they could be elevated, but it is a huge expense.” (ES). All of these financial
challenges are further complicated by limited available funding and the complexity of
retrofitting a port.
Barrier 3 Perceived risks do not exceed an action threshold
Twenty-one of 30 respondents mentioned perceived risks do not exceed an action threshold
(Figure 1). Here, there is risk awareness, but the risk has not exceeded a magnitude or
intensity to prompt an action. It is related to barrier two (a lack of understanding of the
risks) but was discussed in the context of ports being unwilling to invest in the unknown. In
the words of one environmental specialist, “It is a cost-benefit risk management decision to
say how much are you willing to spend for an event that may—or may not ever—take place
. . .” (ES). Disruptions challenge port operations and reconstruction affects the ability to
keep up with operations, given that ports often operate at near-capacity. Decision makers
emphasized that the mission of terminals is to serve their customers, which means, “. . . get
more product in and get it out of the gate.” (DIR) Although they acknowledged the need for
adaptation to natural hazards, they prioritize immediate tasks related to standard operations,
maintenance, and replacement of equipment. The safety planners mentioned that decision
makers lack the will to invest due to this difficulty in predicting the future. Resilience
investment is especially difficult for ports that have little or no experience with severe
storms or flooding events. “We need to change the culture and start to think . . . forward . . .
get in the right mindset of ‘this is . . . real’ . . . we need to face it.” (SP)
Some directors and safety officer perceived that agency culture is not forward thinking
or that the science was not sound. “I am not convinced that there is climate change.” (DIR).
In the opinion of a safety planner “You know, the weather fluctuates! I am trained to look
at facts and in some cases statistics and evidence.” (SAF)
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Barrier 4 Physical constraints limit adaptation options
Twenty out of 30 respondents mentioned physical constraints limit options, including 14
directors, four environmental specialists, and two safety planners (Figure 1). These
location-specific factors or physical/geographical-specific characteristics limit the options
for the port’s infrastructure adaptation. Many noted that facilities were under-designed for
present and future conditions, but expansion of ports into nearby areas, or adaptations along
the river that could allow floodwaters to escape, were impossible—simply because the
coastline was already developed.
Both the directors and the environmental specialists explained this barrier in similar terms
(Figure 3), explaining that refitting ports is both a challenge and an opportunity. Extensive
yard areas would need to be elevated, but “. . . every time you invest, it is an opportunity to
give it [the port/port infrastructure] more lifespan.” (ES)
Safety planners mentioned that current facilities are under-designed and practical
solutions are lacking, in his words, “Right here [around the port authority headquarters], the
challenge is to keep the water from coming up into the side. So, if you had that wall in
place [to protect from storm surge, you risk] trapping the rainfall water in.” (SP) (See S 3).
Barrier 5 – Governance disconnect
Governance disconnect was mentioned by 20 of 30 respondents (Figure 1): 11 port
directors, six environmental specialists, and three safety planners (Figure 1 and S 2). For
directors, this barrier ranked second after the lack of understanding of the risks. Ineffective
governance can result from lack of coordination across sectors, or across levels of
organization, or both. Sometimes, governance is complex for a multi-entity system,
challenged by an absence of coordination or direction. This leads to a lack of clarity on who
decides on infrastructure resilience investment priorities. Nine of the 15 participating ports
in the study were governed by a municipal or regional port authority (Table 2). The
remaining six were either privately owned or had an agency acting as a corporate trust on
behalf of the port owners. In addition, “There are multiple terminals that operate within the
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port that are private” (ES). In regard to deciding on the needed investments, one safety
planner asked, “Who is going to pay for adaptations? . . . to control it? . . . to maintain it?”
(SP). Respondents saw the complexity of multi-entity planning as a limiting factor (Figure
3), with one stating, “I think that as the port operators, we are probably not looking to make
those investments.” Asked if the port has a management plan that considers climate and
extreme weather resilience, this environmental specialist said he was not aware of one. “We
haven't been asked to develop one, so I don't think that [we] have one specific for natural
hazards.” (ES)
Directors also spoke of the challenges of being a multi-entity organization where
facilities and terminals under the port’s authority had different landlords and different
management frameworks. Respondents often described the administration of ports as being
fragmented. “Long-term, [making a decision to] raise the land would be extremely
challenging with how fragmented everything is down here.” (DIR). Another said that while
he had a good relationship with the private owners of the port facility, he was not aware of
their climate adaptation plans.
Respondents also explained that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
only compensates for the costs of bringing the port back up to the required basic code after
a disaster. This gives ports little incentive to elevate their infrastructure beyond the
minimum required, as some respondents mentioned:
FEMA will give you a reimbursement to put a set of offices (like an office trailer)
back where it was, and you don't have to elevate it. The code may require you to
elevate, but FEMA doesn't necessarily give you any additional compensation
beyond what the basic code requirement is.’ (DIR)
Safety planners highlighted this barrier as driven by political decisions, “. . . we got to
play politics to get the finances.” (SP). Or they believed a cause was a lack of direction
from above or the result of ports not being prioritized in large-scale regional planning.
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Barrier 6 – Lack of communication amongst individuals
Lack of communication amongst individuals was mentioned by only one director and one
environmental specialist (Figure 1 and Figure 3). This barrier relates to keeping staff and
stakeholders informed of changes in climate and weather events, as well as adaptation
strategies, in order to be prepared to sustain port operations. The director noted,
“Communication is always the key, making sure that our staff is informed about our plans
moving forward to adapt to the changing weather patterns, communicating with the
captains of the vessels.” (DIR). The environmental specialist saw recent improvements in
communications but added, “But, that [communications] can definitely be an issue from
time to time.” (ES)
Barrier 7 – The problem is overwhelming
The Problem is overwhelming was mentioned by one director and one environmental
specialist (Figure 3 and Table 4). This barrier relates to the enormity of the climate change
problem and humans’ inability to reverse course on global warming. These two respondents
felt that regardless of how much the port prepares, it will always be vulnerable:
“… you cannot control mother nature, the severity of it. For a hurricane to come
through, there is only so much you can do. You are never going to come out of it
unscathed. So, obviously, there are challenges with all that. Although you can
prepare, . . . you are always vulnerable at some of these extreme weather changes.”
(DIR)
Discussion
In this section, we discuss the implications of these findings in the context of other barriers
to adaptation studies. Results outline a typology of adaptation barriers and conditions as
perceived by port decision makers in 15 ports. The consensus in decision makers’
perceptions was measured to identify gaps and trends in their knowledge (Romney,
Batchelder, and Weller 1987). The high level of agreement shared by port decision makers
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–as well as their understanding of the port’s vulnerability (S 4) -- can be used to inform
conversations and collaborations to build port resilience in the North Atlantic region.
The barrier lack of understanding of risk by governance, or leadership, can explain the
lack of will to invest (Barnett et al. 2013); an outcome that is closely linked to perceived
risks do not exceed an action threshold, and/or to lack of funding. Rational decision making
depends on an individual’s understanding of risks, to plan an adaptation action, and to
manage the implementation of strategies (Moser and Ekstrom 2010). Some of the
challenges in understanding the risks, are related to differences between long-term impacts
of barriers to climate and extreme weather adaptation and the short-term [societal]
dynamics that makes adaptation planning difficult (Biesbroek et al. 2013). Sometimes, the
most effective motive leading to adaptive behavior is having experienced recent extreme
weather events (Whitmarsh 2008, Cahoon, Pateman, and Chen 2013, Smythe 2015). To
solve for the lack of understanding of the risks, ports could conduct regular risk or
vulnerability assessment that consider plausible scenarios under various climate futures
(USDOT 2013, Scott et al. 2013, IPCC 2014, Melillo, Richmond, and Yohe 2014); or,
similar to this study, they could assess ports stakeholders’ barrier to adaptation perceptions,
or their perceptions of risks posed by climate change (Yang et al. 2016). Furthermore,
proactively analyzing societal constrains to adaptation as they relate to values, rules and
knowledge would provide needed decision-makers additional information and context
(Gorddard et al. 2012).
Improving infrastructure to withstand more frequent extreme events is often delayed due
to the lack of financial resources (Eisenack et al. 2014). This barrier of lack of funding is
explained in other studies in the context of a governance void (Hajer 2003), absence of
leadership (Becker et al. 2014, Kretsch 2016, Becker and Kretsch 2019) or lack of will to
invest (Vine 2012, Barnett et al. 2013). Such delays can also be explained by misaligned
short-term dynamics of politics and the long-term changes of climate and extreme events
(Biesbroek et al. 2013). As an example, an elected city mayor often makes decisions that
promote him/her during their 4-5 years appointment without considering the enduring
consequences of these decisions on climate change impacts. To address the lack of funding,

19

decision makers mentioned that a change of culture is needed, after all, ports need to keep
their competitive edge—looking into the future, the investments of today depended on the
investments of the past (Crabbé and Robin 2006, Hallegatte 2009, Pechan 2014).
The physical constraints limit options to adaptation included aging infrastructure,
geophysical restraints and the ports physical exposure. Port facilities were described as
being presently under-designed, for present day and future conditions. However, both the
directors and the environmental specialist saw refitting of the ports as both a challenge and
an opportunity to give the port, and its infrastructure, more lifespan.
Governance disconnect may simply result in the lack of a management plan for climate
and extreme weather adaptation (Moser and Ekstrom 2010). Decision makers in this study
described the complexity of planning within a multi-entity organization. This disconnect is
described by others in the context of institutional crowdedness and institutional void, or in
the context of institutional or governance fragmentation (Biesbroek 2011, Ekstrom and
Moser 2014), explained by a lack of clarity of responsibilities for adaptation at local levels
(Huitema, Aerts, and van Asselt 2008, Ekstrom, Moser, and Tom 2011, Mukheibir et al.
2013, Ekstrom and Moser 2014). Others have emphasized on the importance of
understanding the interdependencies that exist between institutions, values, rules, and
knowledge in order to facilitate an make needed changes in decision- making and
adaptation (Stern et al. 1999, Head 2010, Gorddard et al. 2012). This barrier is not singular
to climate and extreme weather adaptation, but present in many types of governance
dealing with a complex problem (Eisenack et al. 2014). It can be political—because of
costs; in some cases, an elected official will defer adaptation because of the high costs
(Vine 2012). When considering local, state and federal governance, different governance
levels would be best suited to address different responsibilities (Mukheibir et al. 2013). One
of the most important steps an organization can take to overcome problems with
governance disconnects is “the inclusion of adaptation and mitigation in their annual
operative plans and budget allocations” (Zambrano-Barragán, Zevallos O., and Enri quez
2010, p. 1).
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Climate and extreme weather adaptation will always be affected by political interest
contesting for support from municipalities (Keen, Mahanty, and Sauvage 2006); it is said
that climate adaptation policies as strategies are at a level of infancy (Cusano, Ferrari, and
Tei 2016). Regulatory change is often long-term in scope, and political agendas are shortterm in scope, making alignment of agendas challenging (Stocker 2013).
Others propose an incremental approach of “extensions of actions and behaviors that
already reduce the losses that can enhance the benefits of natural variations in climate and
extreme events.” (Kates et al. 2001; pg. 641). In this regard, to promote pro-active actions
towards strategic adaptation, both environmental specialists and safety planners interviewed
in this study favored regulatory changes. Regulatory changes that align with a resilience
mandate requires an active leadership in ports that is preoccupied with adaptations. This
type of leadership could influence the allocation of resources to both safeguard the port and
serve the surrounding areas and communities. The role of the responsible actors that are
actively engaged in decision making and climate change adaptations, cannot be
underestimated, and although the decision makers can be informed of many positive
benefits and social-economic outcomes to prioritize on needed adaptations –without a
regulatory mandate -- their governance will continue be constrained by short-term
budgetary cycles (Burch 2010) or outdated constructions standards.
Decision makers mentioned the governance disconnects that arise when collaborating
with other agencies. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) might favor
investment in preparation, response, and recovery for disaster (FEMA2015) and provide
less funding for mitigation activities (Becker and Caldwell 2015).
Lack of communication related to the need to keep port stakeholders informed of risks,
as well as of adaptation strategies. In 2011, Biesbroek et al. also identified lack of
awareness and lack of communication as a barrier to climate change adaptations. In their
study, lack of awareness, or media misinformation influenced public and government
support needed for climate adaptation (Biesbroek et al. 2011). Also, Ng et al. in their study
of ports in Canada, found communication to be a constrained; here stakeholders outlined
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the port’s inefficient ‘go at it alone’ model with inadequate information between port
authorities and port operators (Ng et al. 2018). One way in which ports can address barriers
to climate and extreme weather adaptation is through the establishment of a partnership
approach that integrates multiple stakeholders (Becker 2016a). Cone et al. highlight the
importance of bringing more people into the conversation, as interactions between planners
and stakeholders raise the mutual understanding of potential resilience strategies (Cone et
al. 2013).
Misinformation or misinterpretation of available data further challenges decision makers
(Cone et al. 2013). More work is needed to integrate a larger number of port stakeholders in
the conversation, to identify and overcome barriers (Biesbroek et al. 2013). Efforts should
expand to understand risks both at the port and their neighboring communities through, for
example, promoting a multi-way communication model (McQuail 1987) that helps
rationalize climate risk and uncertainty data in a way that best connects effective plans and
actions among stakeholders and port decision makers. Such an approach can reduce barriers
of communication by enhancing monitoring and learning processes that integrate research,
tools and best available data.
In the table below, additional recommendation actions are outlined for each the different
decision maker type (Table 4).
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Table 4 Additional recommendations for adaptation actions port decision makers can implement (directors
and managers, safety officers and environmental specialists
Port directors & managers

Environmental specialists Safety planners

(1) Work with regulatory agencies to develop (1) Integrate climate risks

(1) Integrate climate risks

regulatory changes that encourage resilience

assessments into the port

assessment into the port

and provide financial incentives.

management plan.

management plan.

(2) Lead managers, port operators, and

(2) Organize working

(2) Organize working groups to

others in organizing and establishing

groups to address climate

address climate risk.

working groups and developing emergency

risk

response strategies (flood barriers, etc.)
(3) Promote learning opportunities,

(3) Acquire and provide

(3) Organize drill exercises to

acquisition of data and communication tools, information on

enhance the ability of port

to enhance understanding of risks.

personnel to respond to natural

environmental risks and

climate change uncertainty disasters.
I.e., Encourage a multi-way communication

as it pertains to

model of communication to downscale

environmental concerns

Outline port safety risks and

climate risk and uncertainty data, connecting

uncertainties and plans/actions

direct plans and actions among stakeholders

needed to reduce them.

and the authorities.
(4) Direct working groups to update port
master plans to include relevant SLR
projections, and/or to develop risk
assessments.

Conclusions
The results of this study suggest that North Atlantic medium and high-use port decision
makers’ perceived barriers to climate and extreme weather adaptation fall into seven
categories. The 30 interviewed port decision makers have consensus on the barriers that
prevent them from implementing resilient adaptations to address risks from storms and
extreme weather events. Port authorities and port administrators, together with state,
federal, and private agencies, can help port decision makers in planning actions to reduce or
remove the barriers to increase the resilience of their ports in a holistic manner. Directors,
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environmental specialists, and safety planners, together with other port administrators and
informed stakeholders can implement the adaptation processes: understanding the barriers,
evaluating strategies and carrying out their implementation and evaluation. Together with
collaborative approaches and better communication flows, adaptation should be facilitated
and supported at the state and national levels. Greater involvement of port tenants and
diverse port stakeholders would also increase the understanding of the risks and generate a
greater sense of responsibility.
While some barriers identified here can be overcome through political will, broader
conceptualization of practices that allow for adaptation practices need to be considered.
Furthermore, researchers and decision makers need to develop a deeper understanding of
the interdependencies that exist between institutions, their values, rules, and the knowledge,
beliefs and values of port stakeholders. Analyzing societal constraints to adaptation can
provide context that enables decision makers to take steps and plan strategic actions to
address the challenges they face.
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S 1 Map of study sites

S 2A Consent Form

S 2B Interview Instrument
Mclean & Becker

Decision maker Barriers to Extreme Weather Adaptation for Seaports: A Cultural
Consensus Model for Medium and High-Use Ports in the North Atlantic

Demographics
1. Name of the port __________________________________
2. What is your position? ______________________________

3. Number of years you have been working as a port manager/safety planner/environmental specialist?
_______
Understanding Barriers
4. Do you feel your port has done enough to address extreme weather concerns? (why or why not?)
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________

5a. Does your port have a management plan that considers long - term planning for natural hazards
resilience? (Y/N) ___
5b. Are there some short-term actions to be planned to increase resilience?
________________________________________________________________________________
5c. Which, if any, extreme weather impacts does this address? Which other natural hazards?
________________________________________________________________________________

7. What are some of the challenges to implement extreme weather adaptation actions at your port?
________________________________________________________________________________
8. You mentioned challenges to implementing adaptation actions (Q7). What resources would enable you
to overcome these challenges?
________________________________________________________________________________
9. What could happen to your port if needed adaptations to extreme weather were not addressed?
________________________________________________________________________________
Conceptualizing Seaport Vulnerability to extreme weather impacts (the CCM)
1. What does “seaport vulnerability to extreme weather impacts” mean to you?
________________________________________________________________________________
2. Which components of the physical infrastructure of your port are exposed to:
a. extreme weather tide-related flooding? ___________________
b. surge damage? _______________________________________
c. or extreme temperatures? ______________________________

3. How would the exposure of your port change with a predicted sea level rise of 2 feet in the next two
years?
________________________________________________________________________________
4. How does your port prepare for an imminent storm (Adaptive Capacity)?
________________________________________________________________________________

5. Compared to other ports in the North Atlantic, what is one thing your port is doing well to increase its
ability to prepare to extreme events or natural hazards?

6. Sensitivity is explained by the level to which a system is changed or affected. This can cause problems
or lead to new opportunities. What facilities of your port do you consider to be sensitive to extreme
weather impacts? ______________________________________________________________________

7a. How do you think your port would cope if the sea level would rise by 2 feet in 2020?
________________________________________________________________________________
7b. How does this prediction change in the face of a storm? ___________________________________
8. The following natural hazards are already impacting some ports in the US. Which ones are you most
concerned about? How would you rank them? (4, high – 0, low):

__ Extreme Temperatures
__ Extreme Precipitation
__ Sea level rise
__ Extreme Coastal Storms (high winds and surge)
__ Tidal flooding

Other: ______________________________________________________________

S 3 Context in which the barriers to climate and extreme weather adaptation are mentioned by
the port decision makers
In the following table the seven categories of barriers are presented. Each has sub-category,
setting the context in which the barrier was mentioned. For example, the category lack of
understanding of risks has six sub-categories. One is confusion over the level of risk and the
difficulty of predicting where impacts will be. Under the sub-category responses by decision
maker type, some distinct responses and differences in viewpoints of given groups were
highlighted. In parenthesis the coded number and type for the respondent are noted, as follows:

Table 1 Barriers to adaptation mentioned in different context. Numbers in the rows are percentages of the total
number (n = 30) of the respondents in each decision maker group that mentioned a strategy in the category at least
one time. Colors denote high agreement (green) to low agreement (orange), to zero mentions (gray).

DIR
n = 17

ES
n=8

SP
n=5

Confusion over the level of risk

18

25

20

Difficulty of predicting where the impact will be

35

63

60

Lack of awareness of risk

29

38

20

Lack of experience with extreme events

59

38

60

1 - Lack of Understanding Risks (93%)

Political discord
Lack of understanding of unintended consequences

20
47

63

40

Cost of adaptation

24

38

60

Environmental regulations increase costs

6

Lack of funding (in general terms)

59

50

100

Perceived risks do not exceed an action threshold (in
general terms)

12

13

20

Agency culture not forward thinking

6

40

Climate denialism

6

40

Conflicting priorities (going green vs resilience)

6

13

Lack of will to invest in the unknown

6

13

Planning for future climate not necessary at present

29

Resilience improvements impact business continuity

18

Resilience investments are not a priority

35

2 - Lack of Funding (77%)

3 - Perceived risks do not exceed an action threshold (70%)

40

13
60

4 - Physical constraints limit options (67%)

Complexity of refitting for resilience

24

50

Existing facilities under-designed for present and
future conditions

77

25

20

Lack of practical solutions

18

25

20

29

13

Complexity of multi-entity planning

47

63

Disincentives for resilience investment (FEMA)

6

13

Lack of clarity over who should pay for resilience

12

13

20

Lack of clarity over who will maintain or control
resilience infrastructure

35

13

20

Lack of direction from above

29

50

20

Political pressure

6

13

40

Seaports are not prioritized in large scale regional
planning

24

13

40

6 - Lack of communication amongst individuals (13%)

6

13

7 - The problem is overwhelming (13%)

6

Port is restricted to its current location

(it can't
move)

5 - Governance disconnect (67%)

13

S 4 Decision makers perceptions surrounding the vulnerability of their ports to climate change
and extreme weather impacts.
Vulnerability is defined as, “the propensity or predisposition to be adversely affected . . .
including the characteristics of a person or group and their situation that influences their capacity
to anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover from the adverse effects of physical events” (IPCC
2012, p. 32).
Although, all groups mentioned vulnerability in terms of adaptive capacity, our assessment on
decision makers’ perceptions of the concept of port vulnerability found that a majority (80%,
24/30) explain it in terms of exposure and sensitivity (Table A1). However, safety planners had
the largest percentage of its group (80%, 4/5) link vulnerability and adaptive capacity. An
explanation could be that these individuals, who address port safety daily, most clearly see the
connection between adaptive capacity and the ability to respond to an extreme weather event.
Table S1 Distribution of the responses by the three categories of decision makers. Values are presented in the
percentages for each group of respondents. The total number of respondents was 30.

Components of

Directors / Managers

Environmental

Safety planners

Vulnerability

(N = 17)

specialists (N = 8)

(N = 5)

Exposure

82.4%

75%

80%

Sensitivity

70.6%

87.5%

100%

Adaptive Capacity

17.6%

25%

80%

Port exposure to climate and extreme weather events was explained in terms of exposure to sea
level rise (SLR), high winds, blizzards, and flooding events that could impact the physical
infrastructure, facility, and cargo; and that could also affect vessels, people, and systems.
Disruptions would slow down, delay, or prevent the port’s functioning, affecting the economic
viability of the port and its ability to deliver goods. Together with the port, waterfront properties,
waterways, and marshlands are also viewed as vulnerable and exposed. Similarly, in sensitivity
terms, these surrounding areas, local population and key ecosystems would have a higher
frequency of rain, storm, and surge impacts. Beyond impacts to physical infrastructure, extreme

events also generate social and economic impacts. Depending on the nature and verity of the
storm and the force of winds, the port’s function could be delayed or crippled. The weather event
could also cause long term physical damage and shut downs. Stored cargo could be destroyed or
lost. Coasts could experience erosion and channels could accumulate more than the usual
sediments.

